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Initial Public Offerings (IPOs) of Energy Companies in Japan 
by 
Yuchao Wu 
August 22, 2013 
This paper analyses the mispricing of 20 energy, utility and natural resources IPOs in 
Japan from the year 1998 to 2009. The study confirms that the offer price and issue 
size have positive relationship with the IPO underpricing. It finds that the 
underwriter’s gross spread is positively related to the degree of underpricing as well. 
Also, the study suggests that the firm’s age, underwriter’s reputation, listing exchange 
are inversely correlated with the stocks’ initial return. It also explores that the IPOs 








1.1.1 Overview of Initial Public Offerings (IPOs) 
IPOs refer to the sale of a private company’s stock to institutional and individual 
investors for the first time. This can be traced back to the Roman Republic and sprang 
up at the end of 1990s’ in the U.S. stock market during the Dot-com bubble. 
Nowadays, IPOs have become a common avenue for companies to go public 
worldwide. Through IPOs, companies are allowed to raise capital from investors in 
open market to use for future expansion.  
There are three main parties engaged in the procedure of IPOs: the issuing company, 
the initial subscribers and the underwriters. In general, an underwriter is an 
investment-banking firm to assist the issuing company to carry out an IPO. It is the 
duty for underwriters to assure the success of this fund gathering activity by providing 
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services including firm valuation and IPO pricing etc. In this transaction, the investors 
aim at realizing a reasonable return to compensate a particular level of risk. While the 
issuers seek to lower the level of underpricing to collect as much capital as possible. 
The underpricing of IPOs is a financial issue discussed by many scholars for decades. 
It is the phenomenon when the issuing company’s stock price is lower that its closing 
price on the first day of listing on the stock exchange.  
1.1.2 Japanese Energy Sector 
Japan is a country lacking several core energy resources such as coal, crude oil and 
natural gas due to its restricted national territorial area and limited natural 
environment. However, along with its accelerated development in heavy industry after 
World War II, Japan accordingly becomes one of the top fossil fuel importing 
countries to satisfy its huge demand of energy consumption. On the other hand, Japan 
has a significant weight in electricity production in the world. According to CIA 
World Factbook 2008, with less than 2% of the world’s population, Japan ranked forth 
of electricity production with 1,025 TWh generated in year of 2008.  What is worth 
noting is that the cost of electricity is comparatively expensive in Japan. Especially 
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after the cut off of nuclear power caused by the 2011 Fukushima earthquake and 
tsunami disaster, the expenditure of electricity jumped sharply.  
1.2 Purpose of Study 
In this paper, the study will discuss whether energy IPOs in Japan are seen to be 
underpriced and the degree of underpricing from January 1990 to December 2012 
including the period of 2008 worldwide financial crisis and 2011 Tōhoku earthquake 
and tsunami. Another purpose of the study is to investigate what factors and 
uncertainties have high correlations with the underpricing of energy IPOs in Japan. As 
clarified above, as one of the largest energy resources importer with significant 
amount of electricity production & consumption, it makes Japan a highly valuable 
market to study the IPOs of Energy companies.  
1.3 Need for Study  
IPOs are treated as a risky investment for investors since there are many uncertainties 
such as information anomaly in IPOs. The results of this study strive to give 
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subscribers the theoretical mean underpricing returns of energy IPOs in Japan under 
specific assumptions. For issuing company, the paper also observes the properties of 
offers and features of different roles in the activity that may be relevant to the degree 
of underpricing so as to help issuers to decrease the effects of underpricing to IPOs. 
Moreover, the study may be useful for underwriters to give better suggestions to both 
subscribers and issuers. Since the underwriters want to sell properly priced stocks to 
their investors clients but also try to maximize the capital gathered from the market 
for their issuer clients at the same time so that they can receive more benefit from 
these transactions.  
1.4 Limitation of Study 
Since the paper restricts the study in Japanese energy sector which contains small 
sample size of companies matching the conditions, it may lead to a relatively large 
deviation from the exact values.  Also, after the decrease of nuclear energy, there are 
more uncertainties but also opportunities for Japanese energy industry. The 
 
 5 
conclusion obtained today may be needed further discuss after new information 
released to the market. 
1.5 Organization of Paper 
The paper consists of five sections. In chapter 1, the paper gives a brief introduction 
to the background and overview of energy IPOs in Japan, purpose and need of the 
study, and the limitation of study as well. In chapter2, the paper demonstrates the 
previous study by other scholars. Based on their conclusions, the paper can be 
improved to be more comprehensive and convincing. In chapter3, there is the 
methodology analysis with specific model used to investigate the problems along with 
a test to detect the appropriateness of the model. The following section will present 
the results of the analysis and discuss further. In the last chapter, the final conclusion 







2.1 Theoretical Explanations for Underpricing 
As far back as 1980’s there have been various interpretations of IPO underpricing 
held by several scholars. Most of them either insists that it is the issuing company and 
underwriter make IPO underpriced intentionally or present that it is the subscriber 
underestimate the issue. Hereby, this study picks six theories behind underpricing to 
provider a comprehensive explanation. The first three theories are attributed to the 
problem of information asymmetry. However, Ritter and Welch (2002) suggest that 
asymmetric information may not be the primary driver of IPO underpricing. The last 




2.1.1 Winner’s Curse  
It is said in the hypothesis that investors are split into the informed and the 
uninformed due to the information asymmetry in the imperfect market. Rock (1986) 
finds that the informed ones have advantages to value companies accurately so as to 
seek for more profitable stocks. However, he argues that, the investors with less 
information about the fair value of shares usually subscribe IPOs equally and received 
much less amount of valuable shares than the informed. After the uninformed 
recognize this winner’s curse they will reduce the subscribing amount or even exit the 
market. Therefore, the issuing company has to underprice IPO to compensate the 
uninformed with a premium. 
2.1.2 Underwriters’ Monopoly Power  
According to Baron (1982), the entity prefers the investment bank to determine the 
issue price. Because not only the investment bank masters superior information about 
the capital market conditions by its monopoly power, but also the issuer is not able to 
supervise the counterparty perfectly due to high monitoring costs. He suggest that, the 
investment bank will set the issue price with a discount on purpose in order to assure 
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the success of issuance, to decrease the risk of underwriting and build better 
reputation among investors as well. A reasonable degree of underpricing can align the 
interests of the issuer and underwriter and allow the entity to avoid problems of moral 
hazard and adverse selection. 
2.1.3 Signaling  
This hypothesis is referred to the information asymmetry between issuing company 
and investors. Allen & Faulhaber (1989), Grinblatt & Hwang (1989), Welch (1989) 
report that the company with good quality will issue underpriced IPO to signalize 
investors in order to have a better performance in the secondary market and a higher 
condition in the subsequent emission. Because after investors collect more 
information about the company they will realize the true value of the stock and be 
willing to pay higher price in the subsequent emission which will compensate the loss 
from underpricing for the issuing company. Allen (1989) document that the 
significant amount of dividend distribution is considered as a signal. And Grinblatt & 
Hwang (1989) identify the number of outstanding shares owned by prior shareholder 
as a signal to other investors.  
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On the other hand, Welch (1989) advances that the good quality companies can be 
distinguished from low quality companies, which have the intention of signaling since 
the imitation cost is too high for them to take the risk.  
2.1.4 Bandwagon Hypothesis 
Welch (1992) believes the investors’ purchase of IPOs is a dynamic process instead of 
a point in time. The decision the made not only depends on the information they 
collected but also badly influenced by other investors. The bandwagon behavior 
indicates that if one stock is popular in the market, investors will subscribe large 
amount of shares regardless of the company’s information they already hold. He 
argues that, the issuing company can provide underpriced IPO to grasp a few potential 
investors and then attract others’ to participate in the subscription so as to assure the 
successful issuance because of the bandwagon behavior. 
2.1.5 Ownership Dispersion Hypothesis 
Brennan & Franks (1995) examine that the underpricing is induced by the executive 
officers to generate excess demand. The subscribers can only obtain the amount of 
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shares prorated. It prevents the stock from significantly holding by minority 
individuals. The executives can retain the control of the company and it increases the 
liquidity of the stock and reduces the risk of takeover (Brennan & Franks 1995).  
2.1.6 Lawsuit Avoidance  
The hypothesis is put forward by Tinic (1988) by the comparisons of degree of IPO 
underpricing before and after the publishing of Truth in Securities Law in 1933 in U.S. 
Because there are strict regulations of information disclosure to protect investors, 
when the stock price keeps falling the entity and underwriter may be sued in 
connection with the false content in the IPO prospectus or undisclosed company 
information by its investors. Therefore, the issuers especially those are subject to 
litigation risk usually underpricing IPO to reduce the likelihood of being charged. 
2.2 Factors Influencing Underpricing 
There are several elements to be examined of the statistically significant correlation 
with the degree of underpricing in this paper. Some of them such as the offer price, 
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issue size, age and underwriter’s reputation have been commonly used in related 
studies. 
In the study of 649 U.S. IPOs during 1975 to 1982 by Chalk and Peavy (1987), the 
average initial return for the group of IPOs priced at or below $1 is about five times 
more than that for the next higher priced group. However, Hanley (1993) studies the 
correlation of IPO underpricing to the offering price by using the Red Herring 
prospectus price range and finds if the price is beyond the upper boundary of the 
offering range by their underwriters, there is a greater degree of underpricing. 
Beatty and Ritter (1986) suggest the issue size is a proxy for ex ante uncertainty, 
which afflicts the future performance of shares. Also they argue that the IPOs with 
smaller size have more likelihood to be underpriced than that with larger size. They 
support the opinion by using 1028 US IPOs from 1977 to 1982. According to 
Ibbootson, Sindelar, and Ritter (1994), if the issue size is greater, there is the less 
uncertainty surrounding the issue, and then the degree of underpricing is lower. 
Durukan (2002) also confirms that the gross proceed is negatively related to 
underpricing by studying the returns of IPOs in the Istanbul Stock Exchange. 
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The age of a company is also an influential factor that negatively correlated to 
underpricing. Muscarella (1989) reports that the younger and start-up companies tend 
to have higher degree of underpricing than those mature and stable ones. 
The underwriter reputation is a factor influencing the IPO underpricing. Carter and 
Manaster (1990) state if the underwriter participate in more issues, there is less 
uncertainty surrounding the issue, and then the offering would be less underpriced. 
Dimovski and Brooks (2004) observed 358 Australian industrial and mining company 
IPOs during1994 to 1999 to state that more IPOs returns generated for issuers with 
underwriters than those without underwriters. Loughran and Ritter (2004) report that 
there is a negative relation between underwriter reputation and DUP in the 1990s in 
U.S. Also, the type of exchange is also significant to underpricing. The more stringent 
the listing requirement is on the exchange, the greater the reputation of the exchange, 
and the less degree of underpricing for the listed IPOs.  
Kini (1995) argues that the bid-ask spread (BAS) is a dominant positively related to 
the IPO underpricing. BAS is the ask price of a stock less its bid price. The relative 
bid-ask spread (RBAS) is also introduced to capture the degree of uncertainty of the 
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issue. The RBAS is the margin between the ask price and the bid price divided by the 
bid price. 
2.3 IPOs in Japan 
Ritter (2013) studies the IPOs performance for both short-term and long-term 
horizons in many countries. He presents a list of different degrees of IPOs 
underpricing in different regions summarized form reports by other researchers. He 
reports an average initial return of 40.2% for 3136 IPOs during the year1970 to 2011 
in Japan. He argues that the degree of underpricing in the short-run in East Asian 
countries such as Japan is reduced in 1990s from 1980s by less regulatory interference 
on offerings price setting. Also, he claims that the IPOs in Japan are sensitive to the 
uncertainty of the consideration of tiny issues and the use of closing price on the first 
trading day.  
From Table 2.3, it is apparent that most of the initial returns for developed countries 
such as Canada, U.S., and U.K. are fairly lower than the emerging countries such as 
Saudi Arabia, China and India. However, as the most developed country in Asia, 
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Japan has a relatively high average initial return of 40.2% than other western 
countries. 





Source: Loughran, Ritter, and Rydqvist (1994), Ritter (2013). 
 
2.4 Previous Energy and Utility IPO research 
There is little research relevant to energy IPOs in Japan. However, Dimovski (2013) 
analyses 158 energy company IPOs from 1994 to 2010 in Australia that is rich of 
natural resources. In the study, he finds that energy IPOs have an average 22% 
underpricing in Australia. Also, he argues that the issue size and underwriter’s 
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reputation have a crucial relation with the IPO underpricing. Besides, he examines 
that the global financial crisis in 2007 does not seem to affect the underpricing 












3.1 Sources of Data  
Most of the information of selected companies is gathered from the website of Tokyo 
stock exchange and Kaneko and Pettway’s Japanese IPO Database which contains 
dataset of Book-building IPOs in Japan. Thomson Reuters Datastream and Yahoo 
Finance is also assistant to observe the companies’ initial total capital, underwriters 
spread proceed prior to the IPO and the historical price of market index Nikkei 225. 
The measuring currency is Japanese Yen in the paper.  
3.2 Sampling design 
In this paper, the sample excludes companies already delisted from the stock 
exchanges for the purpose of convenience during the observation. Also, it focuses on 
IPOs by using book-building method that is efficient for price discovery. In order to 
reduce bias, utility IPOs and natural resource IPOs are combined with energy IPOs to 
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have a comparatively large sample size. In the Table 3.2, it presents the distribution of 
the sample in different industries. There are total 134 companies in energy, utility and 
natural resources sectors in Japan. Because the focus is on the book-building IPOs, 
the IPOs using hybrid auction method are excluded in the sample. Also, since the 
information for some companies is too old to be observed, 20 companies’ offerings 
during 1998 and 2009 are finally selected in this study.  
Table 3. 2: Sampling distribution in each industry 
Industry Total IPOs Sample size 
Oil & Petrochemicals Products 13 2 
Electricity & Gas 25 5 
Iron & Steel 51 2 
Non-ferrous metals 37 8 
Mining 8 3 
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3.3 Methods and Models 
3.3.1 Degree of Underpricing (DUP) 
The DUP can be investigated by examining the initial period return of each stock i 
(IPRi) which is the ratio of the margin between the share’s closing price on the first 
listing day (Pi1) and the offer price (OPi) to the offer price (OPi).  
                       DUP ≡ IPRi = (Pi1-OPi) / OPi                 (3-1) 
From the result,   
If Pi1-OPi is greater than zero, the issue is underpriced. 
If Pi1-OPi is equal to zero, the issue is correctly priced. 
If Pi1-OPi is less than zero, the issue is overpriced. 
3.3.2 Market-adjusted DUP (ADUP)  
The ADUP is obtained by DUP less the return of market index on IPOs’ first day of 
listing (Rim). 
                         ADUP ≡ DUP- Rim                       (3-2) 
In the paper, Nikkei 225 is used as a measurement of market index because it is 
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price-weighted and consists of 225 stocks in all industries including energy, utility 
and natural resource. The market return is calculated by the closing price of Nikkei 
225 on the first listing day of stock i (Ni1) minus the closing price of Nikkei 225 on 
the day prior to the IPO of stock i (Ni0), the result of which is then divided by the Ni0. 
                           Rim = (Ni1- Ni0) / Ni0                     (3-3) 
3.3.3 Ordinary least squares regression (OLS) 
First, an OLS model is employed to investigate the correlations between initial period 
return and its influential elements. The dependent variable is the initial return 
(IN_RETURN) and the independent variables are defined as following: 
 Offer price (OP) 
 Issue size ≡ Logarithm of the total capital raised (LnTCR) 
 Logarithm of the age of the company (LnAge) 
 Underwriter’s gross Spread (UGS) 
 The reputation of underwriting (D_ROU): it is a dummy variable equal to 1 if its 
underwriter is one of the top three in the rank of underwriters and securities 
firms by Kirkulak and Davis (2005), and it is 0 if others. 
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 Type of Exchange (D_EX): this is a dummy variable indicating if the stock is 
listed on TSE (1) or others (0).  
 2007 Global financial crisis (D_2007): this is also a dummy variable reflecting if 
the IPOs were listed after 2007 (1) or before/in 2007(0). 
Most of these factors have been examined to be applicable in explaining the 
underpricing return by researches displayed in the literature review. 
The regression model is: 
   RETURN = β0+β1OP+β2LnTCR+β3LnAge+β4UGS+β5D_ROU  
             +β6D_EX+β7D_2007+ε                                 (3-4) 
The betas are unknown parameters to be estimated and the error term is assumed to 
follow the normal distribution ~ N (0, σ
2
). 
3.3.4 Heteroskedasticity Detecting 
3.3.4.1 Classical Assumptions 
There are several important assumptions established for the classical OLS regression. 
It includes no autocorrelation, no perfect collinearity and the Homoscedasticity. 
For autocorrelation, it is the cross-correlation of the error terms in contiguous time 
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periods. It will lead to the autocorrelation of dependent variables and usually appears 
in the regression using time series data. It is presented as: 
                            Cov (εt, εt-s) ≠0                       (3-5) 
The multicollinearity is the correlation between each independent variable. It is 
detected when the regression has a result of high R square but few significant t-ratios. 
It is present as: 
                                X3i =αX2i                         (3-6) 
The Homoscedasticity means the variance of the error term is constant. It is expressed 
as following: 
                                Var (εi)=σ
2 
                      (3-7) 
This is the counterpart of Heteroskedasticity that the variance of error term is not 
constant:  
                                 Var (εi)=σi
2
                     (3-8)
 
In this paper, since cross-sectional data is used in the regression, the model is tested in 
terms of heteroskedasticity. 
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3.3.4.2 Consequences of Heteroskedasticity 
First, the OLS estimators are not best linear unbiased (BLUE). It makes the estimators 
lose the property of efficiency. Second, the hypothesis testing can be misleading even 
if Heteroskedasticity is recognized. Third, the accuracy of hypothesis testing is 
affected because with Heteroskedasticity the OLS formulate for standard error is 
incorrect. 
3.4.3 Formal detective tests 
Breusch-Pagan-Godfrey (B-P-G) test and White general test can be employed to the 
detection of Heteroskedasticity. In this study, the White test is applied since it work 
well for non-linear forms of heteroskedasticity and does not depend on the normality 
of error term εi which is assumed in the B-P-G test. In the White test, the first step is 
to estimate the model and obtain the estimated residue ûi. Second, we run a regression 
of the square of the estimated residue ûi
2
 on the X variables, on their squares, and on 
their cross products, which are joint variations. Then we make the hypothesis with 
null hypothesis of homoscedasticity and alternative hypothesis of not 
homoscedasticity. Under the null hypothesis, the value of NR
2 
follows the distribution 
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of Chi-square ~ χ
2
D.F., where N represent the number of observations in the regression 




 is the R-square from the regression of ûi
2
 
on X variables, and the D.F. represents the degree of freedom. The null hypothesis is 
rejected when NR
2 
is greater or equal to the critical value of χ
2
D.F, α, where α represent 













Results and Analysis 
4.1 Display of ADUP results 
In Table 4.1, it lists the initial returns and market-adjusted degree of underpricing for 
each IPO in the sample. Almost all the IPOs generate abnormal return ranged from 
2.05% to 217.19% compared to the market index (Nikkei 225) except for the IPO of 
OSAKA Titanium Co. with a negative ADUP of 9.42%. The IPO of First Energy Co. 
generate the highest initial return of 217.3% and market-adjusted DUP of 217.19%. 
For Asaka Riken Co., even if the company initial return is negative 4.4%, but the 
market-adjusted return is positive 2.16%. It indicates that its IPO would be slightly 
underpriced if it were offered in an average performed or bullish market. From this 
table, it is obvious that the issue of IPO underpricing exists in the stocks of energy, 





Table 4.1 Results of IPOs’ ADUP 
Company Name DUP ADUP 
()(%) 
Company Name DUP 
(%)  
ADUP  
Nippon Mining & 
Metals Company 
19.6  20.51  ASAHI 
INDUSTRIES 
75.0  74.96  
Shinnihon Gas 29.3  28.53  Furukawa-Sky 
Aluminum 
22.2  20.23  
Asahi Pretec 75.8  75.61  HIRAKAWA 
HEWTECH 
35.3  33.99  
Shizuoka Gas 52.6  53.14  NIC Autotec 34.9  34.99  
OSAKA Titanium -7.4  -9.42 Idemitsu Kosan 13.4  13.42  
Matsumura Oil 
Research  
11.6  10.54  KYOEI STEEL 16.5  17.55  
HIGASHINIHON GAS 31.5  31.38  FCM 42.9  45.70  
Electric Power 
Development 
3.0  2.05  Asaka Riken  -4.4  2.16  
INPEX 18.1  18.34  Japan Drilling 45.5  45.66  
The First Energy 217.3  217.19  Japan Petroleum 
Exploration 
14.3 16.40 
4.2 The characteristics analysis of variables 
Table 4.2 reports the summary statistics for the IPOs underpricing in energy, utility 
and natural resource sectors in Japan from Year 1998 to 2009. It describes the 
characteristics for each variable including initial return, offer price, the logarithm of 
issue size, the logarithm of firm’s age, the underwriter’s gross spread and three 
dummy variables of underwriter’s reputation, the listing exchange and the listing time 
before of after the 2007 global financial crisis. 
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Table 4.2 Summary statistics for the data set 
Variable Obs Mean STD.Dev. Min Max 
IR 20 37.35 47.99141 -7.4 217.3 
OP 20 270328.8 755700.5 167 3300000 
lnTCR 20 22.33876 2.216246 18.9335 26.6496 
lnAge 20 3.466547 0.805974 1.568616 4.517431 
UGS 20 5.837167 1.623751 2.5 8 
D_ROU 20 0.8 0.4103913 0 1 
D_EX 20 0.6 0.5026247 0 1 
D_GFC 20 0.1 0.3077935 0 1 
From the table above, the initial return ranged from negative 7.4% to 217.3% with the 
mean being 37.35%. This average return is close to the one of 40.2% for 3120 IPOs in 
Japan summarized by Ritter (2013) in his study. Even if there exists an IPO with an 
unusual negative return, which means the stock is overpriced and the subscription 
price is higher than the stock’s closing price on the first listing day. The high average 
first-day return indicates the energy IPO underpricing is a significant issue in Japan. 
The average offer price of ¥270328 is much higher than the lowest one since there is a 
large margin between the maximum and minimum prices and most of them have a 
high offer price. The Asahi Pretec Co. offers the highest price ¥3.3million. However, 
it is not the company raised the most capital from the IPO. The average total capital 
raise among these companies is ¥39.1 billion and the Electric Power Development 
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raises the most capital of ¥374.78 billion from its IPO. In the table, we can see the 
average logarithm of the companies’ age is 3.47. It indicates the mean of the age is 40 
years, which shows that most of these companies have a medium to large scale. Also, 
it can be inferred that the three industries are in a mature business cycle. For 
underwriters’ gross proceed, the mean is ¥5.84 with a range from ¥2.5 to ¥8. 
4.3 OLS regression analysis  
Table 4.3 down below reports the result of the OLS regression of the observed initial 
return on the explanatory variables, for which the model is demonstrated in the third 
part of Methodology to analysis the IPOs underpricing in energy, utility and natural 
resource sectors in Japan from year 1998 to the year 2009. It applies a multiple linear 
regression instead of a single factor regression in order to extend a more 





Table 4.3 OLS regression results for the IPOs underpricing Analysis 
Source SS df MS  
Number of obs =     18 
 
F( 7 ,  10)     =  0.88 
Model 16545.0078 7 2363.57254 
 
Prob > F       = 0.5528 
Residual 26798.4785 10 2679.84785 
 
R-squared      = 0.3817 
Total 43343.4862 17 2549.61684 
 
Adj R-squared  =- 0.0511 
 
Root MSE     = 51.767 
IR Coef. Std. Err. t P>|t| [95% Conf. Interval] 
OP 0.0000215 0.0000197 1.09 0.300 -0.0000223 0.0000653 
lnTCR 4.199562 13.76133 0.31 0.766 -26.46259 34.86172 
lnAge -19.73052 17.54281 -1.12 0.287 -58.81835 19.35731 
UGS 12.8157 16.59033 0.77 0.458 -24.14986 49.78126 
D_ROU -1.428368 33.05859 -0.04 0.966 -75.0875 72.23077 
D_EX -11.11624 38.01375 -0.29 0.776 -95.81615 73.58368 
D_GFC -16.28261 40.79019 -0.40 0.698 -107.1688 74.60359 
_cons -56.77667 377.6343 -0.15 0.883 -898.1982 784.6449 
From the table, the firm’s age, underwriter’s reputation, listing exchange and global 
economic environment are inversely correlated with the stocks’ initial returns. The 
negative sign indicates that if the firm is younger, or the underwriter’s reputation is 
low, or it is not listed in TSE, or it is listed before/in the year 2007, it has a greater 
degree of underpricing. Also, the offer price, issue size and the underwriter’s gross 
spread have a positive relation with the degree of underpricing. It means that if the 
offer price is higher, or the issue size is larger, or the underwriter’s gross spread is 
larger, there is a higher initial return. Even if all of the independent variables generate 
 
 30 
a t-value lower than the critical value of 2, all of their standard errors are greater than 
3.5 and the P-values are all much greater than 0.05. The P-value of 0.05 shows there 
is a 95% confidence that the independent variables are significantly coefficient with 
the dependent variables.  
The result shows a R-square of 0.313, which means 31.3% of the total variations in 
the IPO underpricing can be explained by these independent variables. Also, the test 
of the regression function: F (7,10) = 0.88, Prob (F-statistic) = 0.5528, which 
indicates the likelihood that the true population parameter lie outside the confidence 
interval is considerably high. It infers that not all independent variables have a 
significant effect on the degree of underpricing. The relatively low explaining power 
and low confidence level may be attributed to the fairly small sample size and the 
heteroskedasticity for the variables. Therefore, the result seems not convincing to 
explain the underpricing issue and the white test needs to be employed to investigate 
the statistical significance of the regression model.  
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4.4 Analysis of Heteroskedasticity Detection 
Since there is a low explaining power and a low confidence interval with regard to the 
amount of underpricing return, a White test needs to detect if there is the 
heteroskedasticity in the regression. 
According to the rule of the White test, if the value of NR
2 
is greater or equal to the 
critical value of χ
2
D.F., α, the null hypothesis is rejected and there exists the 
heteroskedasticity. The null hypothesis can be accepted when the value of NR
2
 is less 
than the critical value of χ
2
D.F, α. 
Table 4.4 Result of the White test 
White's test for  Ho: homoskedasticity 
       against   Ha: unrestricted heteroskedasticity 
             chi2(17)     =     18.00 
          Prob > chi2   =    0.3888 
 
     Cameron & Trivedi's decomposition of IM-test 
Source chi2 df p 
Heteroskedasticity 18.00 17 0.3888 
Skewness 7.97 7 0.3356 
Kurtosis 2.00 1 0.1578 




In table 4.4, the result of the White test is presented to check the heteroskedasticity of 
the regression. The value of NR
2
 is equal to the Chi2 of 18 in the table. According to 
the chi-square table, the critical value for χ
2
17, 0.05 is 27.59.  
Therefore, the null hypothesis cannot be rejected, which implicates the 










Conclusion and Recommendation 
5.1 Conclusion 
This paper examined the underpricing of energy IPOs in Japan for the period from 
1998 to 2009. What it found is that the average underpricing for these IPOs is 37.35%. 
It is broadly in line with the findings of previous studies [Dimovski (2013), Ritter 
(2013)]. The implication shows that investor can theoretically make profit through 
subscribing these energy IPOs and selling them on the first listing day. Also, after the 
shut down of nuclear station since 2011 earthquake and Tsunami in east Japan, there 
will be a few new movements in the energy and utility companies in Japan. The study 
might be helpful for investors to grasp the investment opportunities. On the other 
hand, the issuing company can take it into account to generate more accurately priced 
IPOs to raise more capital for its future expansion. 
In this study, it explored the relations between the degree of underpricing and several 
factors as well. The overall results of this study support that the firm’s age, 
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underwriter’s reputation, listing exchange and global economic environment are 
negatively related with the stocks’ initial returns. Also, the offer price, issue size and 
the underwriter’s gross spread are positively related with the degree of underpricing. 
Even if the result of the regression shows these independent variables are not 
statistically significant to the initial return, the fairly small sample size may be the 
main attribution. Since after applying the White test, it is proved that the 
heteroskedasticity phenomenon does not exist in the regression  
5.2 Recommendation 
In terms of future research, since the explaining power and confidence lever are not 
high enough to convince the relation between the DUP and explanatory factors, the 
study need to collect more information about companies’ IPOs to have a larger sample 
size, to take more factors into consideration, and to establish a more reliable model to 
analysis the underpricing in energy IPOs in Japan. 
Also, the long-run performance of these energy IPOs after they listing on the 
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Descriptive statistics for the top 24 ranked underwriters in Japan 
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